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COMMANDERY OF THE DISTRICT OF C( 



WAR PAPER 4. 




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WAR PAPERS 



" ©ur Second Benibardraeal of "Fort 'Fisher." 

PREPARED BY COMPANION 
Rear Admiral 

DANIEL AMMEN, 

U. S. Navy, 



READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF NOVEMBER 2, 1887. 



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I pi-opose a brief sketch of the second bombardment of Fort 
Fisher and the taking of it by assault, and some remarks as to the 
vakie of spherical-shell guns in attacking eaithworks. Comrades 
will remember that we had bombarded Fort Fisher three weeks 
previously; the second time we came to stay, no matter what the 
enemy might do to discourage us. Had the assault failed, the 
troops would have continued to occupy the sand spit north of the 
fort, and torpedo and other launches would have been taken into 
the river. By the aid of calcium lights, steamers could then no 
longer have passed up the river to Wilmington. Fort Fisher, 
thereafter, would have served the enemy no better purpose than 
if situated miles away at sea. I have reason to believe that such 
were the intentions of General Grant had the assault failed. 

On the morning of the 13th January, '65, one hundred vessels 
(in round numbers) were at anchor twelve miles east of Fort 
Fisher. About three-fourths were vessels of war of all grades ; 
the remainder were army transports carrying 12,000 men, under 
the command of General Terry. About sunrise they all got 
under way — the ironclads to attack the fort, and the wooden 
vessels of war, and the transports, to land the troops, with as 
much despatch as possible, some five miles north of the fort, 
on an open sand beach. 

The Ironsides led four vessels of the monitor class : the J\fo- 
nadnock, with two turrets and four guns ; the Canoni'cus, A/a/w- 
pac, and Saugus^ with two guns each, making ten 15-inch 
spherical-shell guns. The Ironsides carried in broadside seven 
1 1 -inch guns and an 8-inch rifle in broadside, a foi'midable bat- 
tery against a sand fort, making, with the monitors, eighteen 



available gjiins. As soon as they were within i,8oo yards, the 
fort opened fire on them, which was quite disregarded until they 
anchored as near the beach as their draught would permit. The 
Ironsides was then about i ,000 and the nearest monitor 700 yards 
from the fort. Then a shell or so was thrown from each vessel 
with a carefully studied elevation, and they then opened fire, 
wdiich was actually maintained by some of them, without cessa- 
tion, for three days and two nights. 

In the meantime the wooden vessels of war and the army 
transports had anchored near the beach, and the process of de- 
barkation went on rapidly. A few shells had been previously 
thrown into the l)rushwood, to arouse any lurking enemy. At 
once a large herd of cattle, frightened at the bursting shells in 
the wood, rushed wildly to the beach. They had been provided 
for the gaiTison of the fort, but surrendered unconditionally, and 
were doubtless found useful auxiliaries. 

At 2 P. M. half of the army force had landed. The second 
line of vessels, led by Alden in the Brooklyn, and followed by 
twelve gunboats, left soon after and anchored in position out- 
side of the ironclads and a little to the northward, so as to de- 
stroy the guns on the land face — the intended line of approach of 
the land force in making an assault. The arrival of our line was 
the cause of increased activity in the batteries of the enemy ; 
they had sobered down a good deal, under the discipline of the 
ironclads, since the morning. The heavy vessels of war left the 
landing of the troops and got into position only a little before 
sunset, having been delayed an hour l)y the fouling of the screw 
of the Minnesota, the leading vessel, commanded by Lanman. 
The third division and tlie reserve line, composed of the weaker 
vessels, remained to comjjlete the landing of the troops and all of 
the stores, which was effected by noon of the next day. 

I recall no sight during the war more superbly grand than the 



bombardment of that evening. As the sun went down and the 
shadows fell upon the waters, the waning light made the burst- 
ing shells flash out in the obscurity, as did the guns of the enemy 
— so far as they were served against such odds. Far above, on 
the fleecy clouds, rested the rosy hues from the departed sun ; 
and underneath, in heavy masses, not high above the fort, laid 
the smoke clouds of battle. It was superlatively grand. But 
soon the shadows darkened into obscurity, and the wooden ships 
were withdrawn from action. All that livelong night did the 
ironclads send their shells, slowly and effectively, and, as found 
necessary, they were supplied with ammunition from tugs, dur- 
ing that and the following night. 

In the forenoon of the next day the wooden vessels of all 
classes came in on the lines assigned them, the frigates about a 
mile from the fort, and double-enders forming another line, 
stretching away towards the entrance of the river, where the 
Mound and Buchanan batteries were located. The fleet, as 
before, directed their fire at the particular guns assigned them ; 
the commanders of the vessels were satisfied and gratified at the 
effect of the shells on parapets, traverses, and the guns of the 
enemy; 15-inch shells with bursting charges of 13 pounds, 11- 
inch with bursting charges of 6 pounds, did their work superbly, 
and even 9-inch shells with bursting charges of only 3 pounds 
were not to be despised, and, besides, there were a great many 
of them. Where the shells fell a crater would appear, and the 
ability to fight the guns was in a large degree destroyed by the 
masses of sand continually thrown around them. As the result, 
some of the guns of the enemy were feebly served, and the 
greater number were silent. When the fort no longer replied 
to the guns of the fleet, signal would be made to fire slowly ; 
one gun at a time from every vessel would then be directed as at 
target pi'actice, against the particular object. The enemy at 



times would be induced by this slow firing to open fire again, 
but only to receive such a storm of shells, in return, as to 
squelch him. One of my Confederate friends, who was in the 
fort, recently told me that the effect of the fire was so damaging 
and overwhelming that they literally covdd do nothing ; great 
logs of w^ood, fifty feet in length, on the parapet, would be 
thrown from their bed and tossed in the air by a shell that had 
buried itself in the parapet. When night-fall of the second day 
came, and the wooden vessels were again withdi*awn, certainly 
the fort had a sorry appearance, and many of the guns had 
been rendei'ed useless. 

In an interview that night, Admiral Porter and General Terry 
agreed upon an assault at noon on the next day. A naval con- 
tingent of 1, 600 blue-jackets and 400 marines was to assault the 
sea face ; the movement was to be made from the northward 
along the beach to the northeast bastion. 

The third day, until the time of the assault, which was about 
three o'clock, the fleet maintained a slow but constant fire on 
the fort without being favored with a reply. During the night 
the army had made an extended line of pits close up under the 
stockade of the fort on the land side, and occupied them. 
When the assault came, the movement was begun from them ; 
the troops were managed in the most courageous and dexterous 
manner, and carried the seven most westerly traverses with little 
loss ; then followed the most stubborn fighting from traverse to 
traverse, the huge shells of the ironclads clearing the spaces 
between the traverses as the troops advanced, and thus the battle 
raged, when daylight no longer served for firing shells; our 
troops had then carried the bastion and a traverse, or more, on 
the sea face. It was not until ten o'clock that the enemy laid 
down his arms. 

The blue-jackets and marines under Breese moved as soon as 



the army began the assault ; a certain number, as a skirmish- 
line, had dug trenches and pits at some distance from the north- 
east bastion, and occupied them in the forenoon. The body of 
the naval force landed later, and advanced over a considerable 
stretch of open beach, and, of necessity, in masses ; the loss was 
heavy, and although a part of the force actually reached the 
stockade at the bastion, its greatest use, unhappily, was to divert 
a very considerable number of the enemy from the land face, 
upon which the army attack was made. The fort was gallantly 
taken, although the naval assaulting column, did not reach the 
parapet. 

All that night, in the distance, the sky was lurid with the 
flames of the burning works, abandoned by the enemy. Although 
the battle was over, the hand of the destroyer yet lingered. At 
sunrise, on the 15th, the main magazine of the fort exploded, 
burying 200 or more persons, fi'iends and foes alike, beneath the 
falling masses. The supposed cause is asserted, that some drunken 
men entered the magazine with a light, expecting to find liquor. 
The army loss in killed and wovmded is given at 700, and the 
navy loss at 383, including 20 missing, supposed to have been 
blown up by the explosion. 

Fort Fisher was regarded as one of the strongest earthworks 
ever constructed as against ships. It mounted some 40 guns, 
almost without exception of heavy caliber; 15 of them vs^ere 
permanently disabled, generally on the land face. In the first 
bombardment a number of our Parrott guns burst, causing a 
serious loss of life. In the second bombardment, the Admiral 
issued an order forbidding the use of rifles. Against earthworks 
when employed within 3,000 yards, spherical shells serve a more 
effective purpose, in my belief, than the same weight of pro- 
jectiles from rifles ; the latter have too much penetration and the 
bursting charges are too small to form craters. 



8 



There were thrown by the fleet into Fort Fisher 22,000 
spherical shells, containinoj heavy bursting charges and weighing 
no less than 2,200,000 pounds. 

As we all know, a brick or stone fort can soon be destroyed 
by rifled guns of inconsiderable power at a distance of 4,000 
yards or more. Nevertheless, the superiority of spherical-shell 
guns against earth or stone works, when within a mile, is estab- 
lished in the belief of most naval men, and they would say the 
more guns are brought against the earthwork the better. We 
have reason to believe such batteries as we fought are quite 
within the control of the numbers of guns that can readily be 
brought against them by even an insignificant naval power. 
Perhaps for this reason naval officers of high rank in our service, 
without exception, so far as I know, regard favorably for land 
defence revolving turrets of large dimensions, known popularly 
as the " Timby system." Had our forts such appendages, there 
would be no enfilading them, nor would it be possible to cover 
the guns with sand when shelled, as is the case with sand- 
batteries. To ensure the turrets working satisfactorily, it seems 
to me that they should be water-borne, which would be the least 
expensive foundation possible for such weights. These ideas 
are given for the reason that the Loyal Legion cannot be 
indifferent as to the best coast defence, and if our naval operations 
during our civil w^ar have afforded any lessons, as at Fort Fisher, 
we should carefully weigh their import. 



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